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ROSE IS IN RED, BLACK Sox ARE BLUE
"It is a wonderful combination-the greatest team I ever had.... It
is by all odds the greatest team in the American League. "
Charles A. Comiskey, describing the
1919 Chicago White Sox.'
"I doubted the outcome.... I don't know what the odds were but I
guess I had about a 50-50 chance. "
Pete Rose, upon learning that a tem-
porary restraining order had been
issued against a hearing into his
alleged gambling activity.2
"Pete Rose is not Shoeless Joe Jackson [of the 1919 Chicago White
Soxi What Pete did is against the rules. What Jackson did was against
the law. Pete made a mistake. Jackson committed a felony... One guy
is a crook, the other just dumb."
Jim Murray, columnist for the L.A.
Times, after Rose's lifetime suspen-
sion by Commissioner A. Bartlett
Giamatti.
1. G. AXELSON, "CoMMY": THE LIFE STORY OF CHARLES A. COMISKEY 218 (1919).
2. Wheeler, Rose Greets Ruling in Private, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989, at C5, col. 1.
3. Murray, Squeezed Play Ensures His Place in Hall of Fame, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1989,
§ III at 11, col. 1.
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Introduction
Commissioner of baseball A. Bartlett Giamatti imposed a lifetime
suspension on Cincinnati Reds manager Pete Rose because an investiga-
tion revealed that Rose may have gambled on Major League Baseball
games, specifically games involving the Reds, between 1985 and 1987.
After the suspension, on August 24, 1989, Giamatti said, "Baseball had
never before undertaken such a process because there had not been such
grave allegations since the time of Landis." 4 Giamatti was referring to
the first Commissioner of Baseball, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who in
1921 banned eight members of the Chicago White Sox who were accused
of conspiring with gamblers to deliberately lose the 1919 World Series to,
ironically, the Cincinnati Reds.'
The "Black Sox" (as the eight White Sox were called) and Pete Rose
scandals are similar. Gambling and the presence of bookmakers
shadowed both incidents, and the existing baseball commissioner chose
to protect the integrity of the game in both instances by imposing base-
ball's harshest penalty: permanent ineligibility.6 Additionally, those os-
tracized were the stars of their times. The eight Black Sox were
instrumental in leading their team to win the 1917 World Series and the
1919 American League pennant. "Shoeless" Joe Jackson, Chicago's left
fielder, held a lifetime batting average of .356, the third-highest of all
time." Right-handed pitcher Eddie Cicotte led the league in wins in 1917
(28) and in 1919 (29), followed closely in 1919 by Claude "Lefty" Wil-
liams (23).1 Center fielder Oscar "Happy" Felsch was a lifetime .293
hitter and led the league in putouts in 1917 and in assists in 1919.9
Equally strong fielders were first baseman Charles "Chick" Gandil, who
had the top fielding average in the league four times between 1912 and
1919, and third baseman George "Buck" Weaver.' 0 Rose, of course, is
baseball's all-time hit leader (4256), and has played in the most games
(3562), recorded the most at-bats (14,053), and hit the second-most
doubles (746). "
4. Giamatti: Sad End of a Sad Story, USA Today, Aug. 25, 1989, at 10C, col. 3.
5. Excerpts from Report Submitted by Dowd to Commissioner Giamatti, N.Y. Times,
June 27, 1989, at 46, col. 1 [hereinafter Dowd Excerpts].
6. MAJOR LEAGUE RULES 15(c), 21(d), 21(f) (1976).
7. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1096 (J. Reichler ed. 1988).
8. Id. at 268, 276.
9. Id at 267, 274, 947.
10. Id. at 243, 263, 267, 274. Weaver had the American League's top fielding coverage in
1917. Id. at 267. The other Black Sox were shortstop Charles "Swede" Risberg and utility
infielder Fred McMullin.
11. Id. at 1409.
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Beyond the apparent similarities between the Black Sox incident of
1919 and the Pete Rose scandal of 1989, stark contrasts in the overall
conditions of Major League Baseball set them apart. The economic con-
dition of the sport was much shakier in 1919, creating great economic
pressures on team owners and players.' 2 Baseball's exemption from anti-
trust laws, an uncertain proposition in the earlier era, has been repeatedly
upheld since then, while the power of owners over players through the
reserve clause has been considerably weakened. 3 Even more impor-
tantly, the powers and authority of the Commissioner of Major League
Baseball, created in the wake of the events of 1919, have been consoli-
dated and upheld by the courts.' 4 Finally, because of stricter state and
federal gambling laws, baseball is safer today from the influences of ille-
gal betting.'5
I
Baseball in 1919 vs. Baseball in 1989: What a
Difference 70 Years Make
A. The Economic Status of Major League Baseball
In 1919, baseball stood on shaky ground, due in large part to World
War I. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker ordered the 1918 regular
baseball season to end after Labor Day as the war continued overseas.'
6
With teams confined to a 130-game schedule, attendance dropped by two
million.' 7 Fear of further losses after the war induced owners to cut
players' salaries and extend the season to 140 games in 1919 (the sched-
ule returned in 1920 to the 154-game schedule that had been the stan-
dard since 1905)."s The owners' apprehensions proved groundless as
attendance totals were higher than expected in mid-July, and the World
Series was lengthened from four-out-of-seven games to five-out-of-nine
games to capitalize on anticipated gate receipts.' 9
12. See infra text accompanying notes 16-34.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 53-65.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 66-97.
15. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also infra text accompanying notes 98-118.
16. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND 96 (1980). Labor Day,
Sept. 1, 1918, was a compromise date among Secretary Baker, American League President Ban
Johnson (who announced suspension of play after July 21), and the owners (who lobbied for
the completion of the scheduled season on Oct. 15). Basel, The Troubled World Series of 1918,
YANKEE MAGAZINE, May 1990, at 40.
17. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 96.
18. E. ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT 15 (1963); L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16,
at 152.
19. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 15-16, 110.
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Broadcasting rights, unlike today, were not a source of major reve-
nue during the 1919 regular season or World Series. Telegraph facilities
in all major league ballparks and in the more important minor league
ballparks sent out and received reports from games throughout the coun-
try.20 For the World Series, Western Union telegraphed play-by-play ac-
tion to halls in the major cities of the United States, where the
positioning of players was re-created on large boards.21 Radio did not
become a powerful national medium until 1926, when the Radio Corpo-
ration of America (RCA), General Electric (GE), and Westinghouse
formed the first major network, the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC).
22
By 1989, Major League Baseball had transcended the 1919 fears of
falling attendance and unattended World Series. New attendance
records were set each year during the 1970s, which generated considera-
ble broadcast revenue. Baseball was so popular in 1988 that Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (CBS) paid $1.1 billion for the rights to
broadcast the World Series, the league championship games, the All-Star
game, and twelve games a year for four years starting in 1990.23 Cable
television flexed its broadcasting muscle when the Entertainment and
Sports Programming Network (ESPN) won television rights to 175 ma-
jor league games each year for four years beginning in 1990.24 Individual
teams cashed in on cable television's revenue as well. The New York
Yankees received $500 million from the Madison Square Garden (MSG)
network for the right to broadcast most of the Yankees' games between
1991 and 2002.25
As the owners prepared their pockets for larger profits in 1989, play-
ers demanded larger salaries. Orel Hershiser, the 1988 Cy Young
Award-winning pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers, signed baseball's
most lucrative contract ever on February 16, 1989, receiving $7.9 million
over three years.2 6 At that time, 108 players earned $1 million or more,
twenty-one of whom earned at least $2 million a year.27 Pete Rose him-
20. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 205 (1922).
21. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 4.
22. E. BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 53-
54 (1975).
23. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 23; Gerard ESPN Will Pay $400 Mil-
lion for Baseball-Game Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1989, at Dl, col. 1.
24. ESPN paid $400 million for the contract. Chass, Another Record for Hershiser: $7.9
Million Dodger Contract, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1989, at DI, col. 1.
25. Id. at D14, col. 2.
26. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, at A29, col. 4.
27. Id.
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self signed a two-year contract in November 1988, that called for
$500,000 a year to manage the Reds.28
The players of 1919 did not have such lofty expectations. On March
21, 1919, Babe Ruth ended his holdout from spring training and signed a
three-year contract with the Boston Red Sox for $27,000. Ruth had
asked for $30,000.29 Most of the White Sox' salaries at this time were far
below Ruth's, even for the stars. Jackson and Weaver never made more
than $6,000 a season, Cicotte received $5,500 in 1919, Gandil and Felsch
made about $4,000 per year, and Williams and shortstop "Swede" Ris-
berg each earned less than $3,000.30 The best-paid member of the White
Sox was second baseman Eddie Collins, whose contract for $14,500 was
purchased for over $50,000 in 1915 from the Philadelphia Athletics. a1
Chicago's World Series opponents made considerably more money than
the average White Sox. Center fielder (and future Hall of Famer) Ed
Roush earned $10,000 in 1919, and pitcher Dutch Reuther, in the league
for only two years, made almost twice as much as Cicotte, a 13-year
veteran.32
Without the outside revenue from broadcasts, ball players in the
early twentieth century were able to force large salaries only when an
upstart league challenged the domain of Major League Baseball. 33 The
Federal League, founded in 1913 as a minor league, was one example.
Its team owners sought major league status in August 1913 and ex-
panded eastward while trying to pry established stars from their major
league teams. Few veteran players jumped to the new league, but those
players staying in the American and National Leagues coaxed salary in-
creases from their teams as a condition for staying. Every established
player's salary nearly doubled at this time.34
B. "In Trusts We Trust": A Historical Look at the Legal Status of Major
League Baseball
The challenge of the Federal League led to a court battle that
threatened the antitrust status that baseball enjoyed as an enterprise up
until 1919. In 1914, the New York State Supreme Court ruled in Ameri-
can League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase that "organized baseball"
28. Texas A&M Punished for Recruiting Violations, L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 1988, at C3, col.
6.
29. Babe Ruth Finally Signs with Boston, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1919, at 16, col. 6.
30. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 20, 60.
31. Id. at 18; L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 90.
32. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 21, 60.
33. The reserve clause and lack of player mobility also kept salaries down. See infra text
accompanying notes 53-65.
34. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 87.
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(the 40 major and minor league teams) was not interstate commerce or
trade subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, because baseball dealt with
players for their services and did not treat them as commodities or arti-
cles of merchandise. 5 In April 1919, however, the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia held that organized baseball did violate the Sher-
man Act in a case stemming from the dissolution of the Federal
League.36
The origins of the case lay in a nine-count federal antitrust com-
plaint filed in January 1915 by the Chicago Federal League team against
Major League Baseball for denying the Federal League access to the
player market.37 The presiding judge was Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
the future Commissioner of Baseball, who had been appointed in 1905 to
the federal bench in Illinois by Theodore Roosevelt. Landis had earned a
reputation as a "trustbusting" judge after he fined Standard Oil
$29,240,000 for antitrust violations (even though his decision was over-
turned).3 In the case of the Chicago Federal League team, however,
Landis withheld judgment to force a settlement.39  Landis' strategy
worked as the parties reached an agreement in December 1915. In ex-
change for dropping their case, the team owners in the Federal League
received $600,000 and were allowed to sell their players to any Major
League club. In addition, the owners of the Chicago Federal League
team were permitted to purchase the Chicago Cubs, and the owners of
the St. Louis Federal League team were permitted to buy the St. Louis
Browns. 4°
Not all of the owners in the Federal League received such favorable
treatment in the settlement agreement. The owners of the Baltimore Ter-
rapins tried to keep Major League Baseball in their city, which had seen
the Orioles, founded in 1901, move to New York after the 1902 season as
the Highlanders (later the Yankees). 41 To counteract the folding of their
35. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441,459, 149 N.Y.S. 6,
16-17 (Sup. Ct. 1914). The court granted Chase's motion to vacate a preliminary injunction
against his playing for the Buffalo Federal team, finding lack of mutuality and a common law
monopoly. Id. at 467, 149 N.Y.S. at 16, 19.
The Sherman Act states, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
36. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1921), aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
37. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 88.
38. Id.; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 155 F. 305, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1907), rev'd, 164 F.
376, 389 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 579 (1909).
39. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 89-90.
40. J. DWORKIN, OWNERS VS. PLAYERS 54 (1981).
41. L. ItOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 105. Major League Baseball returned
to Baltimore when the St. Louis Browns moved there in 1953.
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team, the owners of the Terrapins demanded the right to purchase the St.
Louis Cardinals and to move the club to Baltimore.42 This request was
denied and the Terrapins' owners filed a suit in 1916 against the National
League, the American League, the three members of the National Com-
mission (the ruling body of the National League, the American League,
and the minor leagues), and three Federal League officials, including the
former president.43 In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the plaintiffs claimed that the dis-
bandment of the Federal League and the consequent injury to the Balti-
more club resulted from the defendants' acts in violation of the Sherman
Act." The Terrapins also argued that the National and American
Leagues illegally restrained trade by controlling "practically all available
players of sufficient skill to serve in a major league club, and thus the
Federal League was unable to secure players capable of producing such
exhibitions of baseball as the public demanded."45
The verdict reached in the Supreme Court of the District of Colum-
bia (the forerunner of the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia) seriously threatened baseball's status in 1919. The court
instructed the jury that the defendants had engaged in interstate com-
merce and that they had attempted to monopolize a part of that com-
merce.46 The jury found that the defendants had conspired to destroy
and did destroy the Federal League with the aim of perfecting their mo-
nopoly of professional baseball. The jury awarded the Baltimore owners
treble damages of $240,000."' The repercussions of such a ruling could
have devastated organized baseball. The possibilities included the
following:
" The severance of relations between the American and National
Leagues;
" the severance of relations between the major leagues and the minor
leagues; and
" a revision of players' contracts to eliminate the 10-day clause (under
which a team could terminate all obligations to a player upon 10
days' written notice) and the reserve clause (under which a team
could indefinitely renew a player's contract).
This potential upheaval did not occur because the defendants were
successful in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (the fore-
42. J. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 55.
43. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 207 (1922).
44. Id.
45. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
269 F. 681, 683 (D.C.Cir. 1921).
46. Id. at 684.
47. Id.
48. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 199.
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runner of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit). The
appellate court overturned the D.C. Supreme Court's decision in April
1921, holding that baseball does not violate the Sherman Act because
"baseball is not [interstate] commerce, though some of its incidents may
be."'49 The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, upheld the Court of Appeals' decision on May 29, 1922: "The
business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely state
affairs.""0 By 1989, the Supreme Court had entrenched the antitrust sta-
tus of Major League Baseball. Although the Court now recognizes that
professional baseball's exemption from antitrust laws is "an exception
and an anomaly,"'" federal courts have consistently abided by Justice
Holmes' decision.52
C. The Reserve Clause
Although it has maintained its antitrust status, professional baseball
no longer enjoys the perpetual control over its players that characterized
player-management relations in 1919. Management retained such con-
trol through the reserve clause, which required every player to sign with
his club for one year and to enter into a new contract "for the succeeding




National League owners introduced the clause in September 1879 to re-
serve five players on each club for the 1880 season to prevent price
wars.54 By the late 1880s, every player's contract contained the reserve
clause, which came to provide owners with perpetual renewal rights.55
Players had no alternative but to retire if they did not like the contract
offered by management, who deflated salaries by denying players an al-
ternative market for their services.56 Team owners argued that without
the clause, players would flock to the largest cities and the richest
teams.
57
By 1919 some courts expressed doubts about the enforceability of
the reserve clause, but it remained a part of the standard player con-
49. National League, 269 F. at 685.
50. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
51. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
52. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 439 U.S.
876 (1978); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S., 445, 451 (1957); Toolson v. New
York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953).
53. National League, 269 F. at 687.
54. J. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 10.
55. Id. at 11.
56. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 18.
57. Id. at 82.
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tract.58 The hardship the reserve clause imposed on players was a major
factor in the Black Sox scandal. White Sox owner and president Charles
Comiskey made the most of the reserve system during his reign from
1900 to 1931. He paid his players below-average salaries, knowing that
they could do little about it.59 Seeing no reason why they should not
share in the higher-than-expected gate revenue the team was enjoying in
the wake of the end of World War I, the 1919 White Sox held a club-
house meeting in July and asked their manager to discuss with Comiskey
the possibility of higher salaries. Comiskey did not budge and the play-
ers threatened to strike.'
A strike by an individual team was a tactic that Pete Rose (as a
player) and his contemporaries never had to consider because of the ad-
vent of the baseball players' union, the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), founded in 1954. One of the biggest victories
achieved by the MLBPA came in 1975, when it successfully argued
before an arbitrator that the reserve clause allowed renewal of a contract
for only one year. 61 That arbitration involved pitchers Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally. Neither player had signed a contract for the
1975 season and both believed that they should have been free agents for
the 1976 season. 62 A federal court upheld the arbitrator's decision,63 and
baseball entered the free agency years that saw the average annual salary
double to an excess of $120,000 a year between 1976 to 19 80 .64 In light
of the traditional deference to the authority of the Commissioner of Base-
ball, the presence of an arbitrator in the McNally and Messersmith cases,
and the subsequent upholding of the arbitrator's decision by a federal
court, represented a considerable innovation.6 5
D. The Office and Powers of the Commissioner
In the aftermath of the Black Sox scandal, the leaders of the Major
League created the Office of Commissioner and appointed an ex-federal
judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, to the position. In the years between
the scandals, courts repeatedly deferred to the authority of that office.
58. See, e.g., Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890); cf Na-
tional League, 269 F. 681.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
60. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 16.
61. In re Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 101 (1975).
62. Id.
63. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615, 617 (8th Cir. 1976).
64. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 22.
65. J. DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 32. The first collective bargaining agreement, signed in
1968, provided for an impartial arbiter to settle players' grievance cases. Id.
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Thus, Pete Rose's legal challenge to Commissioner Giamatti, was a bold,
if unsuccessful, move.
Prior to 1919, baseball operated under rules articulated in the Na-
tional Agreement of 1903. This pact resolved the dispute between the
National League, founded in 1876, and the upstart American League,
which was formed in 1900 and which was outdrawing the older league.66
The American League refused the National League's offer in the fall of
1902 to absorb the four best American League clubs to form a twelve-
team league. This refusal lead to the signing of the National Agreement
and to its pledge "to perpetuate baseball as the national game of
America, and to surround it with such safeguards as to warrant absolute
public confidence in its integrity and methods.",
67
The National Agreement also established the National Commission,
comprised of the two league presidents and a chairman chosen by them,
as the ruling body of baseball. 6 The agreement described the powers of
its officers. The league presidents could regulate the actual playing of the
game on the field and could enforce the rules instituted for governing the
game; courts have interpreted these rules to encompass disciplining play-
ers who infringed the rules.69 Further, the presidents could, under the
respective constitutions, appoint, control, and instruct umpires, and sus-
pend any umpire, manager, or player for "offering, agreeing, conspiring,
or attempting to cause any game to result otherwise than on its merits."" °
Even with the creation of the National Commission, several inci-
dents preceding the Black Sox scandal indicated its inherent weakness
and the need for stronger authority. Chairman Garry Herrmann lost the
confidence of both leagues in 1915 when he allowed the St. Louis Browns
to retain future Hall-of-Fame first baseman George Sisler, even though
the Pittsburgh Pirates had originally signed Sisler while he was in high
school.7 ' In 1918, National League President John Tener resigned after
Connie Mack, owner of the Philadelphia Athletics, got a court injunction
against a ruling of the Commissioner that ordered pitcher Scott Perry
back to the Boston Braves, for whom Perry had played before he joined
an independent team and then the A's.72
The New York State Supreme Court found a distinct lack of central
authority within professional baseball when it issued an injunction in Oc-
66. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 69-70.
67. Id. at 70.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, 109 Misc. 138, 144-149,
179 N.Y.S. 498, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 179 N.Y.S. 898 (App. Div. 1920).
71. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 67.
72. Id. at 76.
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tober 1919 against an order by the American League president." The
case before the court involved the attempts of league president Byron
"Ban" Johnson to suspend Boston Red Sox pitcher Carl Mays for desert-
ing his team, which subsequently sold him to the New York Yankees.74
Viewing the suspension as a punishment of the Red Sox and Yankees, the
court held that Johnson had no authority under the American League
Constitution to discipline the clubs of the league. Such power resided
exclusively in the league's board of directors.75 Even assuming the presi-
dent had such authority, the court held that the transfer of Mays was not
a punishable offense. 6 Alternatively, if Johnson's order was aimed at
Mays, his act was still ultra vires. The court determined that, while sec-
tion 20 of the American League Constitution gave the league president
the power to "impose fines or penalties, in the way of suspension or
otherwise, upon any manager or player who, in his opinion, has been
guilty of conduct detrimental to the general welfare of the game," 77 these
powers were subordinate to the authority of each club as set forth in
section 24. According to this section, each club had the authority to:
discipline, punish, suspend or expel its manager, players or other
employ'es [sic], and these powers shall not be limited to cases of dis-
honest play or open insubordination, but shall include all questions of
carelessness, indifference, or other conduct of the player that may be
regarded by the club as prejudicial to its interest ....
The court also found that the league's board of directors, and not the
president, had the power to supervise the disciplinary actions of the
teams and to require that such action be taken.79
This was the league president's authority over the American League
during the 1919 World Series. In February 1920, Garry Herrmann re-
signed as chairman of the Commission, and American League President
Johnson and National League President John Heydler failed to select a
replacement by the start of the 1920 season.'s The owners then resur-
rected a plan first proposed in 1919 to have the game governed by a
prominent citizen, such as General John Pershing or Senator Hiram
Johnson.8 1 On November 11, 1920, the owners agreed to a two-league
organization headed by Judge Landis as the sole arbiter, and they signed
73. American League, 109 Misc. at 144-49, 179 N.Y.S. at 502-04.
74. Id. at 140-44, 179 N.Y.S. at 500-02.
75. Id. at 143, 179 N.Y.S. at 501.
76. Id., 179 N.Y.S. at 501.
77. Id. at 143, 179 N.Y.S. at 502.
78. Id. at 144-45, 179 N.Y.S. at 502.
79. Id. at 149-50, 179 N.Y.S. at 505.
80. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 138.
81. Id. at 199.
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the Major League Agreement establishing the Office of the Commis-
sioner and the Major League Executive Council on January 12, 1921.82
Since its inception, the Commissioner's Office has enjoyed a unique
authority recognized by the courts.8 3 For example, Major League Rule
12(a) states that no assignment between a Major League club and a Na-
tional Association (minor league) club "shall be recognized as valid un-
less . . . approved by the Commissioner." 4 When the American
Association's minor league Milwaukee team tried to enjoin Landis from
voiding the contract of outfielder Fred Bennett, which established an op-
tion with the St. Louis Browns, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois upheld Landis' refusal to approve Bennett's
assignment to Milwaukee and to declare Bennett "absolved from the bur-
dens of the same and of his contract with St. Louis."85 The court found
that the Commissioner had "all the attributes of a benevolent but abso-
lute despot" whose decisions "should be absolutely binding." 6
Courts have accorded similar judicial respect to the Commissioner's
authority to protect the best interests of the game.87 In December 1976,
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn suspended Atlanta Braves owner Ted Tur-
ner for the 1977 season and prohibited the Braves from exercising their
first-round draft choice in the June 1977 amateur free agent draft because
Atlanta had tampered with free agent Gary Matthews of the San Fran-
cisco Giants. 8 Kuhn focused on statements made by Turner at a cock-
tail party in October 1976 in New York, during which Turner told
Giants co-owner Robert Lurie that he would do anything to get Mat-
thews and that he would pay whatever price necessary. 89 Kuhn ruled
that Turner's statements opposed the collective bargaining agreement
and Kuhn's own directives concerning dealings with free agents, and
were therefore "not in the best interests of Baseball." 90
Turner challenged Kuhn's ruling as an abuse of discretion, and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed
in part.9 ' It upheld Turner's suspension, based on the Major League
Agreement: "Judicial review of every sanction imposed by the Commis-
82. Id. at 225; MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT preamble (1975).
83. See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978); Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D.
Ga. 1977); Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
84. MAJOR LEAGUE RULE 12(a) (1976).
85. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n., 49 F.2d at 302.
86. Id. at 299, 302.
87. Finley, 569 F.2d at 527; Atlanta, 432 F. Supp. at 1213.
88. Atlanta, 432 F. Supp. at 1217.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1223.
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sioner would produce an unworkable system that the Major League
Agreement endeavors to prevent." 92 Despite this language, the court
found that denial of the Braves' June draft choice was "simply not
among the penalties authorized" for the offense of acting against the best
interests of the game. 93 The punitive measures available to the Commis-
sioner included a reprimand, deprivation of a club's representation at
joint meetings, suspension or removal of an officer or employee of a
league or club, temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player, and a
fine. 94 Kuhn's decision to deprive Atlanta of its first-round amateur
draft choice exceeded authorized sanctions and was therefore void.9
Oakland A's owner Charles Finley challenged Kuhn's authority to
disapprove the sale of Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to Boston and of Vida
Blue to the New York Yankees in 1976 on the grounds that the sales
were "inconsistent with the best interests of baseball." 96 Finley argued
that the Commissioner could invoke the "best-interest" clause only in
situations involving rules violations or moral turpitude. The Seventh
Circuit disagreed and held that the Commissioner is vested with the au-
thority to take whatever action he deems appropriate upon finding an
act, transaction, or practice to be contrary to the best interests of
baseball. 97
II
"You Bet": U.S. Gambling Laws in 1919 and 1989
The antitrust status of Major League Baseball and the creation of
the Office of the Commissioner were not the only forces that shaped the
Black Sox and Pete Rose cases. The development of federal and state
gambling laws also molded events in 1919 and 1989. Although some
states allow betting on horse races, dog races, and jai-alai, 9s betting on
92. Id.
93. Atlanta, 432 F. Supp. at 1223.
94. Id. (quoting MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, art. I, § 3).
95. Id. at 1226. Kuhn also lost a battle to former New York Yankee owner George Stein-
brenner, who won a temporary restraining order from the New York State Supreme Court that
prevented Kuhn from conducting a hearing into actions and comments made by Steinbrenner
after the 1983 "pine tar game," in which a home run by Kansas City Royals third baseman
George Brett was disallowed because Brett had too much pine tar on his bat. Steinbrenner
claimed that Kuhn could not give him a fair hearing, but Steinbrenner withdrew the suit and
paid a fine during the hearing for a preliminary injunction. Chass, Judge Blocks Giamatti's
Hearing on Betting Charges Against Rose, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
96. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S.
876 (1978).
97. Id. at 531, 535, 539.
98. Church, Why Pick On Pete?, TIME, July 10, 1989, at 18.
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other sporting events is generally a crime in every state except Nevada."
Illinois has had a statute against bookmaking and pool selling since
1887, °° but when the federal government shut down race tracks as a
result of World War I, many gamblers turned to baseball. 10 The current
Illinois statute, modeled on the 1887 law, states that a person commits
gambling when he or she
[m]akes a wager upon the result of any game, contest, or any political
nomination, appointment or election; ... [or k]nowingly owns or pos-
sesses any book, instrument or apparatus by means of which bets or
wagers have been, or are, recorded or registered, or knowingly pos-
sesses any money which he has received in the course of a bet or
wager. 102
Despite the presence of its gambling law, Illinois did not have a sports
bribery statute at the time of the Black Sox trial in 1921.103
The three states in which Pete Rose allegedly placed bets-Ohio,
Florida, and New York-all prohibit gambling."° The statutes in Flor-
ida and New York are similar to those in Ohio, which state, "No person
shall: engage in bookmaking, or knowlingly [sic] engage in conduct that
facilitates bookmaking.... [A] person facilitates bookmaking if he in any
way knowingly aids an illegal bookmaking operation, including without
limitation placing a bet with a person engaged in or facilitating illegal
bookmaking."105 Ohio law further prohibits sports bribery: "No person
shall knowingly . . . offer, give, solicit or accept anything of value to
corrupt the outcome of any athletic or sporting event [or e]ngage in con-
duct designed to corrupt the outcome of any athletic or sporting
event. " 06
In addition to state regulation of gambling, the federal government
has become involved when the states failed to enforce local law or ap-
peared to be influenced by large-scale gambling operations.10 7 Congress
has been concerned mainly with interstate, organized racketeering and
has passed several laws to combat it.108 Anyone who carries out a
scheme utilizing interstate facilities for transportation or communication
99. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0193 (Michie 1989).
100. 1887 Il. Laws 95.
101. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 13.
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
103. Kirby, The Year They Fixed the World Series, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 66. Illinois
passed a sports bribery statute in the wake of the Black Sox' trial. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 29-1, 29-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (Baldwin 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
401 (McKinney 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.14 (West 1976).
105. OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 2915.02 (Baldwin 1989).
106. Id. § 2915.06 (Baldwin 1989).
107. I. ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 23 (1986).
108. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 224, 1084, 1951-1955 (1988).
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"to influence, in any way, by bribery any sporting -contest, with knowl-
edge that the purpose of such scheme is to influence by bribery that con-
test" is subject to fines of up to $10,000, imprisonment of up to five years,
or both."°9 A bookmaker who uses interstate wire communication facili-
ties to transmit bets or "information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest" could be fined up to $10,000 or
imprisoned for up to two years. 110 Under the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organization laws (RICO), "Whoever conducts, finances,
manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling
business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.""' An "illegal gambling business" is one that
violates local law, involves five or more persons, and is in continuous
operation for more than thirty days or has gross revenues of $2,000 in a
single day. 112
Legalization of some forms of gambling began in the early 1960s
after decades of illegality induced by scandals in the 1890s. 113 Even ear-
lier, Nevada acted to legalize casino gambling in 1931 to help the state
combat the Depression." 4 Currently, casinos in Puerto Rico, New
Jersey, and Nevada offer a full range of gambling games, but only Ne-
vada allows sports betting. 15 Americans bet $2 billion with legal book-
makers in 1988, and from 1984 to 1989, all kinds of wagering increased
fifty-seven percent." 6 In that period, casinos took in more than half of
all bets (a total of $164 billion), and sports gambling accounted for the
second-largest take at $28 billion."" In addition to legal gambling, con-
servative estimates put the total amount bet on sports illegally in the tens
of billions of dollars each year."'
109. Id. § 224.
110. Id. § 1084.
111. Id. § 1955(a).
112. Id § 1955(b).
113. I. ROSE, supra note 106, at 2.
114. Id. at 25.
115. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12 (West 1988); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 463.010, 463.0193 (Michie 1986).
116. Church, supra note 98, at 17.
117. Id. at 18.
118. I. ROSE, supra note 106, at 4.
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Black Sox and Gold's Gym: The 1919 World Series
and the Allegations Against Pete Rose
A. The Scandals of 1919 and 1989
1. 1919: The White Sox Turn Black?
In all probability, the Black Sox scandal was set in motion by the
general awareness that illegal bets would be placed on the 1919 World
Series. One source on the scandal said that first baseman Chick Gandil
approached gambler Joseph "Sport" Sullivan three weeks before the
World Series while the White Sox were in Boston and said that a group
of players would throw the Series for $80,000.119 After recruiting Ci-
cotte, Risberg, McMullin, Williams, Weaver, Jackson, and Felsch,
Gandil held a meeting in New York with these players on September 21.
He explained that they would receive the $80,000 in advance. They post-
poned arranging the details of throwing the games until they knew how
the gamblers wished to manipulate the odds.' 20 Former major leaguer
Bill Bums heard rumors at this time about plans for a fix and approached
Cicotte and Gandil, who told him on September 18 that they would
throw the Series for $100,000.121
The actual source of the money for the scheme was New York gam-
bler Arnold Rothstein.122 Burns and his partner Billy Maharg met with
Rothstein on September 23, but he turned down their request for
$100,000.123 Around September 28, former featherweight champion Abe
Attell, a member of Rothstein's entourage, told Burns that Rothstein had
decided to finance the fix, but that Attell would handle the details. 24
Meanwhile, Sullivan met with Rothstein on September 26, and con-
vinced him to pay off the players. 25 Sullivan received $40,000 (the other
half of the $80,000 was to be paid after the Series) from Rothstein's part-
ner Nat Evans (who used the name "Brown") on September 29 and gave
only $10,000 of it to Gandil, who in turn paid it all to Cicotte. At a
meeting in Cicotte's hotel room with the Burns-Attell group of gamblers
the night before Game One, the players agreed to throw the first two
games, since Cicotte and Williams would be pitching.
26
119. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 7-8.
120. Id at 19.
121. Id. at 23-24.
122. Id at 29-30.
123. Id. at 26, 28.
124. Id. at 26, 29-30.
125. Id. at 31, 33-34.
126. Id. at 31, 34, 36-37, 44.
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The White Sox accordingly lost both games, although they did not
receive all the money they had been promised from either of their finan-
cial backers. In Game One, Cicotte gave up five runs in the fourth in-
ning, and Chicago lost 9-1.127 Gandil twice failed to hit with runners in
scoring position in Game Two, and Williams allowed three men to walk
and score in the fourth inning as the Sox lost 4-2.128 After the second
game, Attell and Burns paid Gandil $10,000, which he kept for him-
self.'29 Pitcher Dickie Kerr, who was not in on the fix, won Game Three
3-0, but Cicotte committed two errors in the fifth inning of Game Four to
yield the only two runs during Cincinnati's 2-0 win.130 Sullivan paid
Gandil $20,000 after this game, which Gandil divided equally between
Risberg, Felsch, Williams, and Jackson. (Weaver received nothing since
it was clear he was not participating in the fix).
131
In the next game, Williams surrendered four runs in the sixth inning
after questionable plays by Risberg and Felsch, and Chicago lost 5-0.132
Receiving no payment from the gamblers before Game Six, Gandil drove
in Weaver for the winning run in the tenth inning for Kerr's second win,
5-4. 13 Cicotte won the next game 4-1, cutting the Reds' advantage to
four games to three. To end the suspense, Sullivan hired a mobster to
threaten the lives of Williams and his wife if Williams did not lose Game
Eight.'1 4 In the first inning of that game, Williams threw fifteen pitches
and gave up four hits and three runs while getting only one out as Cin-
cinnati wrapped up the World Series, 10-5.' The day after the Series,
Sullivan paid $40,000 to Gandil. 136 Gandil disbursed $10,000 to Risberg,
$5000 to McMullin, and $25,000 to himself, bringing his total take to
$35,000.
2 1989: Pete Rose's Alleged Baseball Betting
The information on which Giamatti relied to ban Pete Rose was less
dramatic than the Black Sox affair and did not suggest that Rose deliber-
ately tried to lose any games, but it did indicate a pattern of steady gam-
bling activity over a longer period of time. Baseball investigators claimed
that Rose bet on baseball games, including those of the Cincinnati Reds,
127. Id. at 68-69.
128. Id. at 85-88.
129. Id. at 91.
130. Id. at 97, 102.
131. Id. at 103.
132. Id. at 105-06.
133. Id. at 109.
134. Id. at 114, 116-17.
135. Id. at 116-17.
136. Id. at 125.
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from 1985 to 1987.137 Between 1985 and 1986, Rose allegedly placed
bets with Ron Peters, a bookmaker in Franklin, Ohio, through Tommy
Gioiosa, a friend he had met at a local weight room called Gold's Gym.
Peters stopped accepting Rose's bets in late 1986 because Rose allegedly
owed him $34,000. Rose also allegedly bet with an unidentified New
York bookmaker who accepted Rose's money from Michael Bertolini,
the director of Rose's baseball card shows. Evidence of these bets in-
cluded checks made out by Rose to fictitious payees and cashed by
Bertolini.
1 31
After a falling out with Gioiosa in 1987, Rose reportedly used Paul
Janszen (who helped Rose with his weight training) and Steve
Chevashore to place bets with a Staten Island bookie named "Val." By
May, Val refused to accept Rose's bets because Rose failed to pay his
debts, so Rose turned again to Peters, with Janszen as the intermediary.
According to the report given to the Commissioner, Rose usually bet
$2,000 on each game. From April 7 to July 4, 1987, Rose allegedly gam-
bled $852,600 on 390 games, 52 games involving the Reds. 39 The
strongest documented evidence against Rose included betting sheets with
his fingerprints, Janszen's betting notebook detailing Rose's bets on base-
ball and basketball between April and May 1987, Peters' betting records,
and telephone records between Rose, Janszen, Chevashore, Val, and Pe-
ters from April 8 to July 5, 1987.1"
B. Conspiracies and "Best Interests": The Investigations into the Black
Sox and Pete Rose
1. The Sources of Authority To Investigate: Illinois Law in 1919-1921 and
the Major League Agreement in 1989
While the Illinois Criminal Code of 1919 had no statutes prohibiting
sports bribery, section 46 addressed conspiracies to injure the interests of
other parties:
If any two or more persons conspire or agree together... with the
fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the
person, character, business or employment or property of another, or
to obtain money or other property by false pretenses, they shall be
guilty of conspiracy. 14
Thus, at the time of the Black Sox trial, the State could convict a conspir-
ator on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but convictions
of conspiracy were difficult to obtain. Indicted witnesses have the right




141. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 204.
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under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to refuse to testify against
themselves. Thus, prosecutors needed confessions from the
defendants.
142
Under Article I, section 2 of the Major League Agreement, the Com-
missioner may
investigate "any act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or sus-
pected to be not in the best interests of the national game of Baseball;"
determine, after an investigation, what preventive, remedial, or puni-
tive action is appropriate, and .. take such action; and
hear and resolve any dispute between the Major Leagues.' 43
Under the Major League Rules, official acts of misconduct include agree-
ing to lose a game, presenting gifts to a player or umpire for helping to
defeat another team, physically attacking a player or umpire during a
game, and betting on ball games.'" In the latter regard, the rules state,
"Any player, umpire, or club or league official or employee, who shall bet
any sum whatsoever, upon any baseball game in connection with which
the bettor has no duty to perform, shall be declared ineligible for one
year." '4 Players, umpires, or club or league officials or employees who
bet on games "in connection with which the bettor has a duty to perform
shall be declared permanently ineligible."'
The rules also declare that "any and all other acts, transactions,
practices or conduct not to be in the best interests of Baseball are prohib-
ited and shall be subject to such penalties, including permanent ineligibil-
ity, as the facts in the particular case may warrant."' 47 The uniform
manager's contract for the National League (including the one signed by
Rose) incorporates these rules under paragraph five, which states, "The
National League Constitution, Regulations and/or Rules and the Major
League and Professional Baseball Agreements and Rules... are hereby
made a part of this contract."'
' 48
142. Id. at 241, 228, 230; see U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
143. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, art. 1, § 2.
144. MAJOR LEAGUE RULE 21.
145. Id. § 21(d).
146. Id. § 21(d), cl. 2.
147. Id. § 21(f).
148. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages at Exhibit Q,
Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989). Para-
graph nine of the Uniform Player's Contract incorporates as part of the contract the Major
League Agreement, Major League Rules, league rules, and Professional Baseball Rules. See
Basic Agreement Between the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball Players Association,
Schedule A (1990) [hereinafter Major League Baseball Basic Agreement].
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2. A Grand Jury Indicts the Black Sox
The absence of such Major League rules in 1919 limited Comiskey's
ability to find wrongdoing by his club. On October 15, 1919, six days
after the end of the World Series, he publicly offered $20,000 for infor-
mation about any fix.' 49 While withholding the World Series shares of
the accused players (each was to receive a loser's share of $3,154.27),15
Comiskey hired private detectives to investigate whether any of the ac-
cused players had recently acquired a substantial amount of money.
Finding that only Gandil's finances changed appreciably (he bought a
new car, a new home, and several diamonds), Comiskey mailed the
World Series checks and re-signed all of the players except Gandil, who
had retired.15'
Even if Comiskey had proof of the fix, firing the players and releas-
ing them from their contractual obligations (including the reserve clause)
would have been a bad business decision. The players would almost cer-
tainly have joined other teams with little fear of a suspension from the
league or the National Commission, especially in light of Chairman
Garry Herrmann's comment in December that "[t]he matter rests with
Comiskey, who is responsible for the conduct of his players." '152
The State of Illinois did not investigate the matter until almost a
year later, when rumors of another baseball scandal surfaced. On Au-
gust 31, 1920, Chicago Cubs President William L. Veeck received tele-
grams and phone calls claiming that day's game between his fifth-place
Cubs and last-place Phillies had been fixed. 53 The Chicago Herald and
Examiner investigated the rumors and printed an expose on September 4,
charging that some of the Cubs had deliberately lost the game, 3-0.154
Responding to public and political pressure, Illinois State's Attorney Ma-
clay Hoyne (up for reelection in the Democratic primary on September
15) asked Chief Justice Charles MacDonald to convene the Grand Jury
of Cook County. MacDonald granted the request on September 7, 1920.
He announced that a three-week investigation would look into the allega-
tion that bookmakers and gamblers had fixed the Cubs-Phillies game of
149. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 129, 134.
150. Id. at 131. The Reds each received over $5,000. Id. at 107.
151. Id. at 130-31; Kirby, supra note 101, at 66.
152. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 128, 135. Herrmann was also the owner of the Reds, Id.
at 74. He and the other members of the National Commission did not undertake an investiga-
tion when Comiskey approached them after the first game of the 1919 World Series to confide
his fears of a fix. Id. at 74-77.
153. Id. at 149.
154. Id. at 150.
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August 31, in addition to the 1919 World Series and baseball gambling in
general. 155
The grand jury issued subpoenas on September 21. Testimony
before the grand jury and newspaper investigations combined to impli-
cate some of the White Sox. New York Giants pitcher Rube Benton told
the grand jury on September 24 that he had heard that Cicotte, Gandil,
Felsch, and Williams participated in the fix, and three days later the Phil-
adelphia North American ran an interview with Billy Maharg (Bill Bums'
partner) headlined "The Most Gigantic Sporting Swindle in the History
of America!" '156 In that story, Maharg detailed which games of the
World Series were fixed, the offer that Cicotte made to Bums about the
fix, the promised payoff of $100,000, and Attell's manipulations. 157
With his name twice mentioned, Cicotte confessed his actions and
inspired two other players to do the same. On September 28, in the office
of Comiskey's lawyer, Alfred Austrian, Cicotte told Comiskey that he
and some of the other players were "crooked." He appeared before the
grand jury the next day, signed a waiver of immunity on the advice of a
state's attorney, recounted the pressure he received from Risberg, Mc-
Mullin, and Gandil, and described the meeting at which they planned the
fix. He admitted to receiving $10,000 and named Bums and Maharg as
the primary gamblers.'58 On the same day, Jackson contacted Judge
MacDonald, signed a waiver of immunity on Austrian's advice, and ad-
mitted that he had received $5,000 for agreeing to go along with the
plan.1"9 Comiskey suspended the eight players after these confessions,
which led Williams to confess to Alfred Austrian on September 29.160
Indictments for Sullivan and "Brown" (his real name was never dis-
covered by the grand jury) followed Williams' confession, causing Ar-
nold Rothstein to testify, even though he was not indicted. Rothstein,
the only witness before the grand jury allowed the presence of counsel,
minimized his association with the scandal by placing the entire blame
on Attell. Hoyne and Austrian proclaimed Rothstein's innocence after
his testimony.
161
The grand jury handed down its final indictments on October 22,
1920, naming the eight ball players and five gamblers: Attell, Bums, Sul-
livan, the mysterious "Rachel Brown," and former major leaguer Hal
155. Id. at 152-54. Hoyne lost the election to Robert Crowe. Id. at 154.
156. Id. at 159, 168. Benton was suspended from baseball for one year in 1922 for gam-
bling. L. LOWENFiSH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 16, at 109-10.
157. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 168-69.
158. Id. at 170, 173.
159. Id. at 176-77.
160. Id. at 179, 185.
161. Id. at 218-19.
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Chase, who worked with Bums. The indictments included nine counts
of conspiracy to defraud individuals and institutions in Illinois.1 62 To
quantify the injury to Comiskey's business, Austrian claimed the drawing
power of the team declined $300,000 and that player contracts worth
$230,000 were worthless, as exemplified by the Cubs' cancellation of
their purchase of Weaver for $75,000. 163
The vague language of the charges caused a delay in the proceedings
that led to a repaneling of the grand jury. The arraignment took place on
February 14, 1921, with the defendant gamblers absent. Pre-trial maneu-
vering delayed the trial for four months, during which time the confes-
sions of Cicotte, Jackson, and Williams, and other important papers
disappeared. ' 64
The State of Illinois and the American League worked together to
establish the prosecution's case. State's Attorney Robert Crowe recon-
vened the grand jury, fearing that the gamblers formerly indicted would
escape trial through their influential connections.1 65 Five new indict-
ments against Attell's partners, Carl Zork, Benjamin Franklin, David
Zelser, and Ben and Lou Levi, were handed down.
166
American League President Ban Johnson provided $10,000 in
league funds and hired two special prosecutors, actions that were permis-
sible under an Illinois law that allowed interested third parties to hire
lawyers to assist in the prosecution of certain cases.' 67 Although John-
son and Comiskey were longstanding enemies and not on speaking
terms, 6 the league president asserted his third-party rights by trying to
find the best witnesses for the prosecution. Using the same strategy that
Giamatti would employ during his investigation of Rose, Johnson offered
legal protection for the witnesses appearing against the players. He
shielded Maharg from indictment in exchange for his help in locating
Bill Burns in Texas, and promised Burns immunity for providing testi-
mony for the State (with the approval of a prosecutor who accompanied
Johnson to Texas).
169
Despite the issuance of arrest warrants at the end of April 1921 for
all the defendants, Burns was the only indicted gambler closely tied to
the scandal at the trial. Sullivan remained incognito while Chase was
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id. at 204-05.
164. Id. at 231. Hoyne supposedly stole the records for Austrian and Rothstein as he was
leaving office in November. Id. at 226.
165. Id. at 230-31.
166. Id. at 231.
167. Kirby, supra note 103, at 67.
168. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 75-76.
169. Id. at 233-34.
HASTINGS COMMi/ENT L.J. [Vol. 13:551
ROSE IS IN RED, BLACK SoX ARE BLUE
arrested in California, only to be released because of an improper war-
rant. Attell was arrested in New York but escaped extradition when his
case was dismissed after a witness sent from Chicago failed to identify
him.""° Forced to rely solely on Burns, the State of Illinois was ready for
trial.
3. Commissioner Accuses Rose: "A Rose By Any Other Name. ..
The examination of Pete Rose's affairs that sparked his lawsuit
against Giamatti included some of the same features as the investigations
into the Black Sox, including the testimony of gamblers, an active press,
and the scrutiny of the accused's financial records. In mid-February
1989, Paul Janszen and his girlfriend made allegations about Rose to
Commissioner Peter Ueberroth. Ueberroth and National League Presi-
dent Giamatti, elected on September 20, 1988 to succeed Ueberroth on
April 1, met with Rose on February 20 and asked him if he ever bet on
Major League Baseball games. Rose denied the charges but conceded
that he bet regularly on other sporting events.17 1 After receiving more
information, Ueberroth invoked the investigative powers granted by the
Major League Agreement and hired John M. Dowd on February 23 to
look more closely into Rose's supposed gambling. At this time, word
spread through the baseball profession that Sports Illustrated was prepar-
ing an article based on information from Ron Peters, the Ohio book-
maker who claimed to have knowledge of Rose's baseball gambling. Just
as newspaper allegations about the fixed Cubs-Phillies game helped spur
Illinois officials to call the Cook County Grand Jury in 1920, Rose's sup-
porters contend that the impending story in Sports Illustrated (printed
March 21) pressured Ueberroth to conduct his own investigation.
1 72
Based on information from Janszen, Dowd's investigation turned to-
ward Peters, who received favorable treatment similar to that afforded
Rothstein and Burns for their testimony by Illinois state attorneys in
1921. Facing charges of cocaine distribution and tax evasion, Peters was
told in his formal deposition that in exchange for his "full and truthful
cooperation with the Commissioner, the Commissioner has agreed to
bring to the attention of the United States District Judge in Cincinnati,
the fact that you were of assistance to us and that we believe that you
have been honest and complete in your cooperation." 1 73 Peters told
Dowd that he took bets for Rose from late 1984 to late 1986, and again
170. Id. at 231-33.
171. Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989)
(Affidavit of A. Bartlett Giamatti at 5).
172. P. ROSE & R. KAHN, PETE ROSE: MY STORY 233-34 (1989).
173. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages at Exhibit F,
Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989).
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in 1987, on professional football, college basketball, and Major League
Baseball, including Reds games while Rose was a player and manager.1
74
After Peters' testimony, Giamatti honored Dowd's promise and wrote to
U.S. District Court Judge Carl Rubin on April 18 to say, "It is my pur-
pose to bring to your attention the significant and truthful cooperation
Mr. Peters has provided to my special counsel .... Based upon other
information in our possession, I am satisfied Mr. Peters has been candid,
forthright and truthful with my special counsel."'
1 5
Dowd deposed Rose on April 20 and April 21, and Rose gave hand-
writing exemplars, tax returns, car lease arrangements, airline records,
and bank check stubs. On May 9, Giamatti received Dowd's 225-page
report, which came with seven volumes of exhibits, including transcripts
of interviews and copies of gambling records. The report detailed Rose's
gambling activity and highlighted his bets on baseball and the Reds from
1985-1987. 176
Based on this information, Giamatti informed Rose of his intent to
conduct the hearing on whether Rose's conduct was not in the best inter-
ests of baseball and whether Rose violated Major League Rule 21(d),
prohibiting betting on baseball games. ' 77 Unlike the formal rules of pro-
cedure and evidence that the district attorney of Cook County had to
follow in presenting evidence to the grand jury in 1921, the Major League
Agreement empowers the Commissioner to formulate rules of procedure
to be followed during the discharge of his duties. 178 Ueberroth developed
the most recent set of such rules, which includes the following:
" a requirement for written notice of the time and place of hearings;
* permission for the persons or organizations concerned with the hear-
ing to appear and be heard in person, to present witnesses, to cross-
examine witnesses, and to be represented by an attorney;
" the option for the proceedings to be "conducted in general like judi-
cial proceedings and with due regard for all principles of natural
justice and fair play, but the Commissioner may proceed informally
whenever he deems it desirable"; and
174. Dowd Excerpts, supra note 5.
175. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages at Exhibit G,
Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989). Judge
Rubin was so appalled by Giamatti's letter that he turned over Peters' sentencing to another
judge. Callahan, The Darkening Cloud Over Pete, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 57. Peters received a
significantly reduced sentence of two years, compared to the maximum of 21 years. The gov-
ernment based its request for the reduced sentence on Peters' assistance in a grand jury investi-
gation of Rose's taxes. Aldridge, Rose Sues Giamatti, Reveals Allegations He Bet on Reds,
Wash. Post, June 20, 1989, at E5, col. 1.
176. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
177. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages at Exhibit J,
Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989).
178. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, art. I, § 2(e) (1975).
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* the option for the Commissioner to follow "established rules of evi-
dence but may depart from them in cases in which the ends of jus-
tice will in his judgment best be subserved by so doing."
179
In accordance with these rules, Giamatti planned to allow Rose to be
represented by counsel and to present any statements or testimony of
witnesses, provided that Rose notified Giamatti in writing two days in
advance of the names and nature of the testimony of the witnesses. Any
such witnesses would be subject to cross-examination. Further, Rose
could present other evidence, submit briefs, and make arguments at the
hearing.'8 0 Giamatti denied Rose's attorney's contention that his proce-
dures and Dowd's report were not fair, but granted a 30-day extension,
rescheduling the hearing to June 26, 1989.11 In the interim, Rose filed
suit to keep Giamatti from holding the hearing.
C. The Trials
1. ' People v. Cicotte
When the Black Sox trial began before Judge Hugo Friend on June
27, 1921, the defendants challenged the procedures used against them,
taking the same stance that Rose would later take. They moved to quash
the trial, charging that the indictments were illegal under Illinois law.
Their motion was denied. Judge Friend ruled that there was sufficient
evidence of five separate conspiracies:
" to defraud the public;
* to defraud White Sox catcher Ray Schalk;
" to commit a confidence game;
" to injure the business of the American League; and
" to injure the business of Charles A. Comiskey.' 8 2
179. Major League Baseball Commissioner's Rules of Procedure.
180. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages at Exhibit J,
Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989). If Rose
were still a player at the time of the Commissioner's action, the Major League Baseball collec-
tive bargaining agreement would have dictated the procedure to be used. Under Article XII of
the agreement, the clubs and the players' union recognize that a player may be subjected to
disciplinary action for just cause by his club, his league, or the Commissioner. Major League
Baseball Basic Agreement, supra note 148, art. XII. The usual grievance procedure does not
apply to "a complaint which involves action taken with respect to a Player or Players by the
Commissioner involving the preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public con-
fidence in, the game of baseball." Id. art. XI, § A(l)(b).
During a hearing to be conducted by the Commissioner within 30 days of the disciplinary
action against a player, persons with a direct interest in the hearing may attend, an informal
procedure will be used, players may be represented by a representative of the Players Associa-
tion, parties may offer evidence that will not be subject to the legal rules of evidence for rele-
vancy or materiality, all testimony must be taken under oath, and all witnesses who testify
must be made available for cross-examination. Id. art. XI A(l)(b), Appendix A.
181. Exhibits M, N, 0, P, Rose v. Giamatti, No.A8905178 (Ohio Ct.C.P., Hamilton Cty.
Filed June 25, 1989).
182. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 240.
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The jury was selected on July 15 and opening statements were made on
July 18.
The prosecution's case rested on the theory that the defendants
completed their conspiracy offenses when they agreed to fix the games.'
8 3
The strongest evidence on this point came from the testimony of Bums
and Maharg. Bums implicated all of the defendant players except Jack-
son who, Bums said, was not present at a meeting in Cicotte's room the
morning before Game One. Bums further testified that he had promised
the players that Attell would supply $100,000 to throw the Series, and
that the players agreed to throw the games in any order they were told.
He admitted that the players did not get the entire $100,000, but that he
paid $10,000 to Gandil after Game Two."8 4 Maharg provided similar
testimony on July 27.
Bums also described a meeting he had attended with Cicotte and
Gandil in New York on September 18 as the White Sox were wrapping
up the pennant. According to Bums, Gandil told him, "If I could get
$100,000, I would throw the World Series!" 88 This was the first sugges-
tion that the idea for the fix came from the players and not the gamblers.
On cross-examination, the defense tried to establish that the $100,000
proposal came from Attell, but Bums repeated that it was the players'
demand.'8 6 Although Bums and Maharg blamed the players for initiat-
ing the conspiracy, accounts of the trial indicate that no witnesses ever
identified specific misplays by the eight players or offered expert opinions
about their individual performances.
18 7
Without proof of deliberate errors, weak hits, or easy pitches, the
most significant proof of the players' participation in the conspiracy was
their acceptance of money. The prosecution's best evidence on this point
was the confessions of Cicotte, Jackson, and Williams before the grand
jury. Although the original grand jury transcripts of the confessions and
the waivers of immunity were still missing, Gorman requested to use as
an alternative the testimony of grand jurors and court stenographers,
who could read from their notes. After conducting a private interroga-
tion of the players, however, Judge Friend ruled that the confessions had
183. Kirby, supra note 103, at 68.
184. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 247-50.
185. Id. at 253.
186. Id. at 254.
187. Kirby, supra note 103, at 68. Some records, including subpoenas, indictments, and
the verdict, are on file with the clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. E. ASINOF, supra
note 18, at xii-xiii.
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been made voluntarily and were admissible to implicate the confessors,
but not other players."' 8
The text of the confessions helped to solidify the charges that the
players took part in the conspiracy. Cicotte, Jackson, and Williams ad-
mitted that they made an agreement with gamblers to fix the World Se-
ries and had accepted cash: Cicotte received $10,000 before Game One,
and Jackson and Williams each received $5,000 after Game Four.1" 9 Ci-
cotte's confession detailed how he threw soft pitches and how his own
deliberate errors led to both Cincinnati runs in Game Four.' 9°
Despite connecting them to the scheme to throw the World Series,
the confessions did little to establish the key element in a conviction for
conspiracy: intent. The statute required "fraudulent or malicious intent
wrongfully and wickedly to injure... another," and no evidence pointed
to any intent beyond a mere desire to make money. 191 The defense fo-
cused on this weakness in the prosecution's case and called eight wit-
nesses, including several teammates and manager William "Kid"
Gleason, to further establish the lack of intent.
Comiskey's finances thus became the subject of the last defense wit-
ness's testimony. Unsuccessful in its attempt to firmly establish an ab-
sence of intent to conspire against Comiskey's business, the defense
counsel tried to show at least that the White Sox organization suffered no
financial setback after the 1919 World Series loss. Harry Grabiner, sec-
retary of the team, testified that the team's gate receipts for 1920 were
$910,206.95, almost seventy-five percent higher than 1919's total of
$521,175.75.192
The trial ended with closing arguments from July 29 to August 2.
The prosecution highlighted the confessions of Cicotte, Jackson, and
Williams and argued that once the players and gamblers agreed to fix the
games, they had formed an illegal conspiracy.' 93 The State asked for a
guilty verdict with five-year prison sentences and $2,000 fines for each
defendant.' 94 Defense attorney Ben Short defined the law for the jury:
The State failed to establish criminal conspiracy. There may have
been an agreement entered by the defendants to take the gamblers'
money, but it has not been shown the players had any intention of
defrauding the public or of bringing the game into ill repute. They
188. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 260; Kirby, supra note 103 at 68. Judge Friend ruled
that he would not allow the confessions as evidence unless the state could prove they were
made voluntarily. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 257.
189. Id. at 172, 177, 186.
190. Id. at 172.
191. ILL. CRIM. CODE § 46 (1919), quoted in id. at 204.
192. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 265.
193. Kirby, supra note 103, at 68.
194. E. ASINOF, supra note 18, at 266.
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believed any arrangement they may have made was a secret one and
would, therefore, reflect no discredit on the national pastime or injure
the business of their employer as it would never be detected.195
The judge's charge to the jury followed the defendants' interpreta-
tion of the law more closely than the prosecution's definition. Judge
Friend told the jury, "The State must prove that it was the intent of the
ballplayers and gamblers charged with conspiracy through the throwing
of the World Series, to defraud the public and others, and not merely to
throw ballgames."' 96 The jury deliberated for about two hours in the
early evening of August 2, 1921 and found the players and the gamblers
not guilty.
197
2. Rose v. Giamatti
Two factors distinguish the trial of 1921 from the proceedings in
1989. First, Rose, the manager, initiated the court action against Com-
missioner Bart Giamatti, unlike the Black Sox, who were brought into
court under indictment. Second, unlike the earlier criminal proceedings,
Rose's action was civil in nature, a complex amalgam of contract and due
process arguments to prevent defendants Giamatti, Major League Base-
ball, and the Cincinnati Reds from conducting a hearing into Rose's al-
leged betting on baseball. Additionally, the Rose case also brought out
such procedural issues as judicial review, choice of venue, and diversity
jurisdiction.
Rose's complaint stated that he sought "injunctive and declaratory
relief arising out of threatened irreparable harm to his reputation as one
of the foremost participants in Baseball and to protect and preserve his
right to be judged in a fair hearing by an unbiased decisionmaker."' 98
Specifically, he sought immediate injunctive relief to restrain Giamatti's
June 26 hearing. Rose grounded his complaint on seven claims for relief,
with the most important being breach of contract.
The breach of contract theory centered on the idea that Giamatti
was contractually bound to Rose to conduct all phases of his proceedings
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure as required by the Major
League Agreement. 99 Rose claimed that Giamatti, the trier of fact, had
circumvented the Rule of Procedure to conduct the proceedings "in gen-
eral like judicial proceedings" by becoming improperly involved in the
investigation and by determining that Peters had given truthful testi-
195. Id. at 268.
196. Id. at 270.
197. Id. at 272.
198. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgement, and Damages at 1, Rose v.
Giamatti, No. A8905178 (Ohio Ct. C. P., Hamilton Cty. Filed June 25, 1989).
199. Id. at 27, para. 69.
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mony before hearing Rose's account. Further, Rose could not confront
his accusers, nor cross-examine them, particularly those named by
Dowd. According to Rose, Dowd's report "would never be admissible in
a fair hearing," thereby making its usage a violation of the requirement
in the Rules of Procedure that the Commissioner follow "in general...
the established rules of evidence.""' 2° Rose further alleged that Giamatti
had allowed himself to become "actually biased and prejudiced against
Pete Rose" and had also "refused ... to give Pete Rose a fair chance to
establish his innocence" by not recusing himself from the proceedings, by
not allowing Rose a longer period of time to conduct discovery or to be
present during the depositions of the witnesses in Dowd's report, and by
not holding the hearing in Cincinnati.2"' In an ironic twist, Rose based
his breach of contract claim on the same clause in his contract (para-
graph 5) that subjected him to the Major League Agreement and the Ma-
jor League Rules that forbid gambling.
The second claim of relief was based on implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing. These duties, according to the complaint, arose
from Rose's contractual agreements to accept the discipline of the Com-
missioner and to forego the right of judicial recourse, from the Commis-
sioner's express duties to uphold "the best interests of the national game
of Baseball [and from the] Commissioner's fiduciary duty to Baseball and
its participants. "2 2 The third claim for relief alleged that Giamatti
breached this fiduciary duty.
203
The fourth claim for relief centered on a policy argument similar to
the substantive due process argument that the Black Sox raised at the
beginning of their trial. Rose alleged a denial of procedural due process,
claiming that social or business association members have certain due
process and natural justice rights when they agree to subject themselves
to an internal decisionmaker. Those rights, granted by public policy and
Ohio law, include "reasonable notice and a hearing with a fair opportu-
nity to defend the charges, an absence of bad faith, and compliance with
the [association's] constitution, bylaws, and other rules and
regulations.'
Citing correspondence from Giamatti pertaining to the investiga-
tion, Rose's fifth claim of relief was promissory estoppel. Rose said that
Giamatti was bound by his previous characterizations of the proceedings,
which were to conform to the Rules of Procedure, to provide Rose and
200. Id. at 27, para. 70(d); see supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 28-29, Exhibit M.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 30.
204. Id. at 30-31.
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his counsel with any material information they requested about the inves-
tigation, and to keep Dowd from making any conclusions about Rose's
guilt or innocence.20
The last two claims of relief grounded themselves in tort law. The
sixth claim was one of negligence, and the seventh was tortious interfer-
ence with economic relations. Rose alleged that Giamatti had intention-
ally and improperly interfered with Rose's contract with the Reds, and
had improperly interfered with Rose's "advantageous economic relations
with businesses that promote their products and services through using
his name and likeness.1
20 6
Rose filed his complaint with the Court of Common Pleas for Ham-
ilton County, Ohio on June 19, 1989. Judge Norbert Nadel held a hear-
ing on Rose's motion for a temporary restraining order on June 22.
Weighing the elements for injunctive relief,207 Judge Nadel found irrepa-
rable harm to Rose if Giamatti's hearing were held as scheduled the next
day and no harm to Major League Baseball orto the public if the hearing
were not held. Further, while recognizing the reluctance of courts to
become involved in the affairs of Major League Baseball, he addressed
"the most difficult issue" in the case: whether Giamatti was an impartial
and unbiased decisionmaker regarding Rose. Reading Giamatti's letter
to Judge Rubin into the record and calling Peters "Peter Edward Rose's
chief accuser," Nadel held that the Commissioner had prejudged Rose
and the scheduled hearing would be "futile, illusory, and the outcome a
foregone conclusion." Accordingly, he granted Rose's motion for a four-
teen day temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the pre-
liminary injunction for July 6.208
Just as local politics may have colored the decisions of Illinois state
attorneys in 1919, local pressures may have influenced the next steps in
Rose's case. Judge Nadel was up for reelection in 16 months when he
granted the restraining order, and some legal experts considered his deci-
sion a hometown ruling for a local hero."° After Ohio's First District
Court of Appeals in Cincinnati denied Giamatti's motion to suspend the
restraining order because such orders are not appealable, Giamatti
sought to remove the entire case to the United States District Court for
205. Id. at 31-32.
206. Id. at 33.
207. See, e.g., Dodd v. Rue, 64 Ohio Misc. 21, 27-28, 411 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ohio Ct. C.P.,
Hamilton Cty. 1979) (The elements considered by the judge were the irreparable harm to the
plaintiff if the injunction were not granted, the prospect that the harm would be outweighed by
the harm to the defendant, and the lack of harm to the public).
208. Excerpts from the Ruling by Judge Nadel, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989, at C4, col. 2.
209. Lieber & Neff, The Case Against Pete Rose, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1989, at 10,
14.
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the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, in Cincinnati.21° That
court in turn immediately transferred the case to the Eastern Division in
Columbus: "Plaintiff is not just another litigant. He is instead a baseball
figure of national reputation closely identified with the Cincinnati Reds
and the City of Cincinnati."21 Judge Nadel postponed the July 6 hear-
ing while Rose's attorneys had two weeks to file arguments to keep their
suit in state court.
Federal District Judge John D. Holschuh heard the arguments on
July 20 and faced a crucial jurisdictional question. Federal courts have
"diversity" jurisdiction when the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000
and the action is between citizens of different states.212 As defendants,
Giamatti was a citizen of New York and the Cincinnati Reds team was a
citizen of Ohio. As one of the teams in Major League Baseball, the Reds
caused the league to be a citizen of Ohio for diversity purposes. If either
the Reds organization or Major League Baseball was a party properly
joined in the action, the diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and
all the defendants would be defeated, causing the district court to remand
the case to state court.21 3
On July 3 1, Judge Holschuh decided the jurisdictional questions in
favor of Giamatti. He considered first the doctrine of fraudulent joinder
which prohibits a plaintiff from naming a nondiverse defendant against
whom the plaintiff has no real cause of action, thereby defeating a de-
fendant's right of removal based on diversity of citizenship.2" 4 He then
focused on the practice of disregarding nominal or formal parties to the
action and determining jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of the real
parties to the controversy.215 The judge defined a "nominal party" as
one who "has no interest in the result of the suit or no actual interest or
control over the subject matter of the litigation." '216 Finding no contro-
versy between Rose and the Reds, Judge Holschuh characterized the
Reds as nominal parties and disregarded their citizenship for diversity
purposes.217 Similarly, the judge found that "Rose's controversy is not
with Major League Baseball, but is with the office of the Commissioner
210. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 909 (S.D. Ohio 1989). Giamatti's lawyers acted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1988), which states, "[A]ny civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be re-
moved by the defendant... to the district ourt ... embracing the place where such action is
pending."
211. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 908.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
213. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 911, 913.
214. Id. at 913.
215. Id. at 914.
216. Id. at 914-15 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 923.
1991]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
of Baseball for the Commissioner's alleged failure to follow his own pro-
cedural rules." 2 8 The clubs of Major League Baseball "have no legal
interest in the controversy," and were also disregarded as nominal
parties.219
With his motion to remand denied, Rose appealed the decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The three-
judge panel there unanimously rejected Rose's appeal on August 17,
1989.22° Judge Holschuh scheduled a hearing on August 28 for Rose's
request for a preliminary injunction against Giamatti's hearing.
During his consideration of the jurisdictional matters, Judge Hol-
schuh hinted how he would rule on the injunction if Rose were to lose his
appeal: " '[T]he Major League ... Rules' which are expressly incorpo-
rated into Rose's contract with the Cincinnati Reds are the extensive
rules of conduct formally adopted by the members of Major League
Baseball and not the procedural rules independently promulgated by the
Commissioner which govern only his own proceedings."'22 ' Judge Hol-
schuh found that when proceedings involve disciplinary matters, "the
major league baseball clubs have made the Commissioner totally in-
dependent of their control.
222
D. "Yer Out!": Permanent Ineligibility
1. Acquitted and Banned For Life (1921)
As has been noted, during the fallout of the controversy generated
by the allegations against the Black Sox, the Major Leagues created the
office of Commissioner and selected former federal district court judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis to hold the position.223 Determined to deal
218. Id. at 918-19.
219. Id. at 921. But see Note, Maintaining the Home Field Advantage: Rose vs. Federal
Court, 10 Loy. ENT. L.J. 695, 706 (1990) (authored by Kimberly G. Winner) ("[The court's]
conclusion [to disregard Major League Baseball as a party for determining diversity jurisdic-
tion] is wrong for two reasons. First, the court applied the wrong standard to evaluate
whether Major League Baseball's citizenship may be disregarded. Second, the court mis-
perceived the nature of the primary relief sought by Rose.").
220. Rose v. Giamatti, No. 89-8328, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1989). Rose had been
granted a motion on August 11 for an order preserving the status quo pending his appeal. This
order enjoined Giamatti from proceeding with Rose's disciplinary hearing scheduled for Au-
gust 17. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 924, 928 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
221. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 916 (S.D. Ohio 1989). But see Note, supra note
219, at 708, 710 ("[T]he Rules of Procedures promulgated by the Commissioner do not exist
separate and apart from the Major League Agreement, but rather spring from it ... Since the
entire Agreement is expressly incorporated into Rose's contract with the Reds, it is inherently
more reasonable to find that all procedural rules that were promulgated pursuant to that agree-
ment are also incorporated into Rose's contract.").
222. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 906, 919.
223. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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forcefully with the scandal, the new Commissioner placed the eight pre-
viously indicted players on the ineligible list, even as the Grand Jury of
Cook County prepared to reconvene for new indictments on March 14,
1921. Unlike the Yankees owners two years before who challenged Ban
Johnson's cancellation of the sale of Carl Mays, Comiskey accepted Lan-
dis's decision and immediately gave the seven remaining players their
formal unconditional release.224
Landis made the Black Sox's ineligibility permanent after their ac-
quittal on August 2, 1921. He announced:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player who throws a ballgame,
no player that undertakes or promises to throw a ballgame, no player
that sits in conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers
where the ways and means of throwing a game are discussed and does
not promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professionalbaseball. 22?tl
Two of the players, Weaver and Jackson, sought unsuccessfully to
be reinstated. Landis denied Weaver's request for reinstatement in De-
cember 1921; Weaver struck out six more times before subsequent Com-
missioners Happy Chandler and Ford Frick. Jackson never asked for
reinstatement to the Major Leagues, but was denied the opportunity to
be the player-manager of the Greensville, South Carolina minor league
team in 1933 by Landis.226
Both Weaver and Jackson sued under their contracts after they were
out of baseball. In 1921, Weaver took Comiskey to court to collect the
remainder of the three-year contract he had signed in 1920 for $7,500 per
year. A federal court dismissed the case in 1924 when Weaver's attor-
neys failed to appear, and Comiskey settled out of court.227 Jackson sued
Comiskey in 1924 for $18,000 -$9,000 for each of the last two years of
his three-year contract. At trial, Comiskey mysteriously produced Jack-
son's grand jury confession that had disappeared four years earlier, and
he used it to prove Jackson's breach of contract. Based on his confession,
the court determined that Jackson had committed perjury when he
claimed innocence in the Black Sox conspiracy. Even though the jury
awarded him $16,711.04 as the balance of his contract, the verdict was
set aside as based on perjury and the case was dismissed. Jackson settled
out of court for a small part of his salary.228
Landis's actions, and Comiskey's acceptance of them, established
the power and authority of the Commissioner. By finding the Commis-
224. E. AsINOF, supra note 18, at 230.
225. Id. at 273.
226. Id. at 279, 281, 292.
227. Id. at 280.
228. Id. at 289-92.
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sioner's disciplinary action against Pete Rose or any player to be beyond
the control of the twenty-six major league clubs in 1989, Judge Holschuh
continued this tradition of deference.
2. Banned, Then Found Guilty: A Faded Rose
While the Black Sox survived their courtroom battle only to lose the
baseball war, Rose received his banishment from the game as part of a
compromise to keep a court from deciding his case. On August 23, 1989,
Rose and Giamatti signed a five-page agreement in which Rose "recog-
nizes, agrees and submits to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner" to investigate and determine what action is appropriate
for acts "not in the best interests of the national game of baseball."
Rose's attorneys executed a stipulation dismissing with prejudice Rose v.
Giamatti, and Rose agreed to forego a hearing by the Commissioner by
acknowledging that Giamatti had a factual basis for the penalty im-
posed.229 Under Rule 21, Giamatti declared Rose permanently ineligible
and placed him on the Ineligible List, where the Commissioner may put
a person found guilty of acts under Rule 21 or convicted of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude. Under Rule 15(c), Rose could have applied for
reinstatement one year after being placed on the list, but he did not do
SO.
2 30
It is not clear which provision of Rule 21 Rose violated. The agree-
ment states that "nothing in this agreement shall be deemed either an
admission or a denial by Peter Edward Rose of the allegation that he bet
on any major league baseball game. "231 Nevertheless, Giamatti said, "In
the absence of a hearing ... and in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary,... I've concluded that [Rose] bet on baseball" and on the Reds.232
Rose claims that he was banned under section (f) for associating with
bookmakers and felons and placing illegal wagers with bookies on foot-
ball and basketball games.233 Rose said that he signed the agreement
because even if he had won in court, "I still would have been banned for
that associating with gamblers stuff."'234  Unlike some of the Black Sox
229. The Agreement, USA Today, Aug. 25, 1989, at 100, col. 1.
230. Id; MAJOR LEAGUE RULE 15(c); Chass, Board Says Rose Is Ineligible for Hall of
Fame, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1991, at B9, col. 2.
231. McCoy, Maximum for Rose: Life, The Sporting News, Sept. 4, 1989, at 10, col. 1; 12,
col. 1.
232. Id. at 12.
233. P. ROSE & R. KAHN, supra note 172, at 236. Gioiosa has been convicted for tax
evasion and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Lieber & Neff, Deeper and Deeper: Last Week
Another of Pete Rose's Former Cronies Accused Him of Betting on the Reds, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Feb. 12, 1990, at 50.
234. P. ROSE & R. KAHN, supra note 172, at 253. If Rose had not signed the agreement
and had tried to challenge his suspension in court, such a suit based on antitrust liability might
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who confessed to throwing the 1919 World Series, Rose continues to
maintain his innocence. He claims that an expert says that the handwrit-
ing on the betting sheets is impossible to identify. Of the three finger-
prints on the sheets, only one is clearly identifiable as Rose's. Rose
speculates that Janszen, who handled much of Rose's autograph busi-
ness, once handed him a piece of paper just to get a fingerprint. Finally,
Rose points to a gambling expert who says that the sheets do not resem-
ble real betting sheets with a set system.235
Despite his denial of the gambling charges, Rose's admission of guilt
to federal tax violations has kept him in the ignominious company of the
Black Sox on the Ineligible List. Eight months after his banning, Rose
received the added stigma of being a convicted federal felon. He pleaded
guilty on April 20, 1990 to two counts of filing false income tax returns in
1985 and 1987.236 Federal officials began their investigation in April
1989, and, in addition to his conviction and subsequent jail term, re-
quired Rose to pay $366,043 in back taxes, interest, and penalties, mostly
on undeclared income from baseball card shows, memorabilia sales, and
winnings from ten Pik Six horse races. 23" Rose received his sentence on
July 19, 1990, which included five months in prison; one year of super-
vised release, the first three months of which were spent at a Cincinnati-
area halfway house; 1,000 hours of community service at five inner-city
elementary schools and a boys club; continued psychiatric treatment for
his admitted gambling addiction; and a fine of $50,000, plus $100 in
court costs. 238 Judge S. Arthur Speigel said of the sentencing, "Mr. Rose
must serve some time in a prison setting for his crime in order to main-
have failed for three reasons. First, Major League Baseball is exempt from antitrust liability.
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). Second, the Commissioner has wide latitude in protecting the best inter-
ests of the game. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp 1213, 1222
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978). Third,
some courts have found that a league decision to ban an individual is not an antitrust violation
under the right circumstances. See, e.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp.
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In Molinas, Jack Molinas of the Ft. Wayne Pistons was banned from the
NBA for betting on his own team to win. The court found that disciplinary rules calling for
such a suspension are reasonable restraints and necessary for the league's survival. The league
acted reasonably because it had to maintain public confidence in the game (which had eroded
after a series of gambling incidents) and effectuate its policies against gambling. Id. at 243-44
also Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Comissioners: A Historical
and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1412
n. 17 (1990) (authored by Matthew B. Pachman).
235. P. ROSE & R. KAHN, supra note 172 at 245, 246, 244.
236. Lieber & Wulf, Sad Ending for a Hero, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 23, 1990, at 22,
24.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id. at 22-23.
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Just as judges maintain consideration for the laws of their jurisdic-
tion, the commissioners of sports uphold the integrity of their leagues'
rules. The Commissioner of Major League Baseball, unfettered by poten-
tial liability under federal antitrust laws and enjoying broad powers
under the Major League Agreement, occupies a unique position among
commissioners of professional sports. He is "totally independent of [the
clubs'] control" in disciplinary matters, and all the clubs themselves may
be found to be "neutral bystanders" to a dispute between a player or
manager and the Commissioner. 2" As the embodiment of Major League
Baseball, Giamatti's successors will probably keep the Black Sox and
Rose on the ineligible list in order to "maintain respect for the law" of
baseball and to deter "others who might consider cheating" on the rules
of the game.241
239. Pascarelli, Hustled Off to Prison: Rose Gets Five Months, The National Sports Daily,
July 20, 1990, at 4, col. 1, 5, col. 2.
240. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 919, 921 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
241. Rose is also ineligible for election into the Baseball Hall of Fame as long as he remains
on baseball's ineligible list. At its February 4, 1991 meeting, the Hall of Fame's board of
directors passed a resolution barring any player on baseball's ineligible list from appearing on
the Baseball Writers Association of America ballot for the Hall of Fame. Chass, supra note
229, at B9, col. 4.
A player becomes eligible for the Hall of Fame five years after his retirement, which
occurs in December 1991 for Rose. A screening committee selects the players that appear on
the writers' ballot, and candidates remain eligible for 15 years if they receive at least five per-
cent of the vote each year. If a player is not elected in that time, but received 60 percent of the
vote in any one year, he would be considered for election by the Veterans Committee. If Rose
is reinstated in more than 15 years, he could not be elected by the Veterans Committee because
he would not have received any votes from the baseball writers. Id at BI 1, col. 3.
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